[SGVLUG] Vote stealing

[jmd]

On Sep 18, 2006, at 7:23 PM, Zack, James wrote:

> Actually, my proposal should have read a printed receipt that gets  
> placed into a ballot box, only to be opened in the event of a recount.

>
if the image running in the electronic ballot box is fixed to record  
a given output to steal an election, wouldn't the people  
*engineering* the election also make sure a paper printout matched  
the tainted results? i would imagine the file used to record a vote  
is just sent to the print spool.

as this topic was mentioned on slashdot a few days ago, one really  
now has to wonder if electronic voting is a good thing. personally i  
don't. i'd be glad to take a day off work and hand count election  
ballots.

http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/10432334/ 
was_the_2004_election_stolen

after gathering people from various professions, robert kennedy's  
article concludes that the outcome of the 2004 election was a  
statistical improbability without some help from *engineers* so to  
speak.

jeff - who is very worried about our democracy *in his best dustin  
speak :)*
>
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> [mailto:sgvlug-bounces at sgvlug.net] On Behalf Of Zack, James
>>
>> I am all for technology, but it needs to be done right.  So
>> if you were going to build the perfect, fairest, most secure
>> voting machine, what would you include?
>>
>> My list includes paper receipts for each voter to visually
>> confirm on paper their votes cast
>
> While this sounds nice, does it actually do any good?
>
>   -- more than likely, the "paper receipt" will be thermally printed,
> which will degrade in ordinary sunlight, placed in a wallet (body  
> heat),
> or just "time"; by the time a recount arrives, you're "ballot" will be
> as unreadable as a butterfly-ballot from Florida...
>
>   -- Even though you have a receipt that says "voted for G.  
> Washington",
> when you hear he "lost by a vote of 3-2", you're going to figure you
> were one of the two -- you would /HAVE/ to know that three other  
> people
> voted for him, and that's the point behind our current system, you
> /cannot/ know how specific people voted, so you /cannot/ know that  
> three
> other people voted for him unless you asked (and you're not  
> supposed to
> ask...)
>
>   -- having lost, and having called for a recount, given the usually
> dismal turnout to begin with, how many people are actually going to
> bring out their faded, torn, crushed, or otherwise obliterated  
> receipts?
> Chances are, if you voted for "the sure thing", you probably tossed it
> the minute you got home (or a week later when you find this wad of  
> paper
> in the bottom of the laundry...); if you voted for the "underdog" that
> somehow won, you'll have likely kept the receipt in as near pristine a
> condition as possible AND be all jazzed to help "prove" he or she was
> the rightful winner (because, after all, you were for that person to
> begin with...)  The "sure thing" folks will also think "there are  
> enough
> /other/ people who /must/ have voted for this guy, they don't need
> me..."
>
>   -- and having brought those faded-or-otherwise "receipts", how many
> will be challenged on the grounds that they were forged or otherwise
> "made up" -- you'd have to have a system that would allow you to tie
> back a receipt to a specific ballot, which you cannot legally do
> either...
>
> Now, having said all that, I can't think of anything better  
> either... :(
>
>
> ...although (thought brewing here...)
>
> The video pointed out that it's driven by smart cards -- your card  
> could
> be your receipt since (also as the video pointed out) once you've  
> "used"
> the card, the system marks it as such so it cannot be re-used.  Smart
> cards have non-volatile memory, so your "choices" could be recorded on
> the card, cryptographically "signed" by the machine [even if as
> brain-dead as a straight md5sum] and that "checksum" printed on the  
> card
> [thinking along the lines of the "laserscribe" CD/DVD writers...]  The
> checksum by itself would not reveal how you voted (each card would  
> have
> it's own salt, or you could be asked for a passphrase, etc. to ensure
> that two identical casts would have different checksums)
>
> Since you would retain your "receipt", (which is far less  
> susceptible to
> the elements than thermal paper...) you would be in control of how,  
> if,
> and when your "vote" becomes public knowledge (as it would have to in
> the above scenario for a recount)  It could be placed in a
> physically-separate (and secured) reader for recounting purposes --
> checking the inscribed checksum against the calculated one; printing
> hard copy for the voter to review and confirm, etc.
>
>
>
> <winmail.dat>