<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=windows-1252"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Hey no argument, OK! It's especially frightening if you consider the market-share numbers that article provided.<div><br></div><div>My point was that at least there *exists* a fix, however draconian.</div><div><br></div><div>The renegotiation bug has no fix yet. Also I forgot to mention that disabling renegotiation breaks client certs and smart cards (for practical purposes) because the way Apache does client certs is to first establish a connection and then renegotiate to a connection with a client cert.</div><div><br></div><div>Maybe after we deal with this issue, dealing with an incompatible upgrade to TLS 2.0 (or whatever they call it) will look easy.<br><div><br><div><div>On Apr 8, 2014, at 2:01 PM, Eric Gillingham <<a href="mailto:gillingham@bikezen.net">gillingham@bikezen.net</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite">Straightforward to fix doesn't mean easy.<br><br>You will have to revoke every certificate on the machine, and reset<br>every single private bit of information that something linked to<br>libssl could have ever read into memory as it's now exposed, you also<br>have to write off all previously protected traffic as fully public.<br><br>This information should be repeated again and again because I don't<br>think people are really considering the potential impact.<br><br>- Eric<br><br>On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 1:44 PM, Henry B Hotz <<a href="mailto:hbhotz@oxy.edu">hbhotz@oxy.edu</a>> wrote:<br><blockquote type="cite">Agreed!<br><br>However it's only (-:™:-) an implementation bug, so it's straightforward<br>(-:™:-) to fix. |-P<br><br>A couple of months ago yet another protocol error in TLS renegotiation was<br>discovered. It's comparable to the one in 2008 that prompted TLS 1.1. AFAIK<br>they have not yet even decided how to fix it this time and there is talk<br>that the fix should be more comprehensive (and done by different people)<br>than the last one. The net effect is to break the cryptographic binding<br>between the cert(s) and the channel, permitting MITM attacks (even when<br>client certs are used). Short-term mitigation is to disable TLS<br>renegotiation. No big deal for short connections, but theoretically a bad<br>idea for large data volumes.<br><br>This has to be really embarrassing to all the black-funded experts who<br>analyzed TLS 1.0 and pronounced it secure. They obviously didn't look at<br>renegotiation, only the initial connection.<br><br>On Apr 8, 2014, at 11:16 AM, Matthew Campbell <<a href="mailto:dvdmatt@gmail.com">dvdmatt@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><br>Wow this is major.<br><br>Matt<br><br>On Apr 7, 2014 6:08 PM, "Rae Yip" <<a href="mailto:rae.yip@gmail.com">rae.yip@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><blockquote type="cite"><br>In case you haven't heard, patch your OpenSSL libraries:<br><br><a href="http://heartbleed.com/">http://heartbleed.com/</a><br><br>And then change your secrets.<br><br>John K, you must be feeling pretty smug right now. ;)<br><br>-Rae.<br><br></blockquote><br>Personal email. <a href="mailto:hbhotz@oxy.edu">hbhotz@oxy.edu</a><br><br><br><br></blockquote><br></blockquote></div><br><div apple-content-edited="true">
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: -webkit-auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; font-size: medium; "><div>Personal email. <a href="mailto:hbhotz@oxy.edu">hbhotz@oxy.edu</a></div><div><br></div></span><br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
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